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À Marie-Rachel 
“Sorry that was so dense. 
David P. Baron 
Good luck” 
O ne day, a friend emails me that David P. Baron is in Paris for a conference and will give a lecture the next day... She adds that, since I have spent most of the 
last summer over his papers on private politics and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), not only should I go and listen to him but I should also ask him for an 
autograph! 
Shall I really play the academic groupie? 
Well, I went to the conference and was pleased to hear the real David, whose talk 
was as striking and inspiring as his papers. To be fair, it was a conference for 
economists so, obviously, not everything was as clear as crystal to me... 
Anyhow, after the talk, I had to face the reality: David P. Baron was there, people 
were actually talking to him, and I had brought with me the first paper I had 
studied. The one I spent ten days on. And for which I had desperately needed the 
help of an economist friend and colleague (thanks Ben!) to understand the series of 
equations and the model... 
So I went to David – still wondering how silly my request would seem – and asked 
him for the autograph after a confused introduction involving the usual thanks and 
compliments, the reason I was there at the conference and my special request... 
Fortunately, David 
Baron is not only a 
great academic, he 
also has a good 
sense of humour! He 
took the paper, 
laughing, and wrote 
those kind words 
you can see on the 
image above. Yes, 
that was dense! And 
thank you David 
for the best wishes... 
Meeting with David Baron 
and introducing private politics1 
Notes prises par Julie Bastianutti 
École polytechnique 
LES 9 & 10 JUIN 2011 
S’EST TENUE THE 
ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
CONFERENCE, 
COORGANISÉE PAR LES 
MINESPARISTECH, 
PARIS SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS ET 
L’UNIVERSITÉ 
PANTHÉON-SORBONNE. 
DAVID BARON 
(STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY) EN ÉTAIT 
LE CONFÉRENCIER 
INVITÉ. 
 1. Je tiens à remercier Marie-
Rachel Jacob pour son 
soutien dans cette longue 
odyssée baronienne jusqu’à 
la rédaction de cet essai et 
Benjamin Lehiany pour ses 
explications précieuses sur 
les équations et modèles 
des articles de D. Baron. Je 
remercie Hervé Dumez pour 
sa patience lors de 
relectures et discussions, 
pour  ses remarques 
tou jours  per t inentes , 
particulièrement quand 
elles s’accompagnent d’une 
ironie jamais caustique, 
toujours piquante. L’auteur 
doit évidemment être tenu 
pour seul responsable des 
erreurs que pourrait 
comporter ce texte. 
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In this essay, I will present the work of David Baron from his seminal research on 
non-market strategy in the 1990’s to the latest developments on private politics and 
the economy of CSR, focusing in the end on the lecture he gave in June 2011 at the 
École des Mines in Paris2. 
David P. Baron is one of the world specialists of the economics of CSR. He is a 
researcher and professor at Stanford University, where he has been teaching CSR for 
MBA’s for ten years. Some readers of the Libellio will know him for his capital work 
on integrated and non-market strategy (Baron, 1995; Baron, 1996; Dumez & 
Jeunemaître, 2005; Depeyre & Dumez, 2009; Bastianutti, 2011). Baron points out 
that the firm’s environment is not neutral and that its performance and viability is 
also conditioned by factors and events that are occur outside of the market 
boundaries and involve other actors than competitors; in his view: 
A nonmarket strategy is a concerted pattern of actions taken in the 
nonmarket environment to create value by improving its overall 
performance [...] The nonmarket environment consists of the social, political 
and legal arrangements that structure the firms’ interactions outside of, and 
in conjunction with, markets (Baron, 1995, pp. 47-48). 
Value creation is not a mere function of market decisions and actions, and it can be 
positively as well as negatively affected by legal changes or socio-political events. 
Just as firms create value by developing and deploying market assets, they 
employ nonmarket assets to add value. Nonmarket assets take a number of 
forms. They include expertise and competency in dealing with nonmarket 
forces, government, the media, interest and activist groups, and the public. 
They include a reputation for responsible behavior earned with consumers, 
government, stakeholders, and the public. To the extent that its nonmarket 
assets and competencies are unique or difficult to replicate, a firm has a 
nonmarket advantage” (Baron, 1995, p. 60). 
The activity of the firm itself can enhance the importance of nonmarket issues (for 
example, food legislation after a bacterial infection) or, on the contrary, diminish it 
(to a certain extent, labor standards after the Nike sweatshop case settlement and 
the creation of the Fair Labor Association): 
Since many nonmarket issues arise from market activity, one approach is to 
view nonmarket strategies as complements to market strategies 
(Baron, 1995,p. 55). 
The idea of complementarity suggests that market and nonmarket strategies can 
benefit from one another and should not be elaborated not independently. 
Nonetheless, since the notion of nonmarket strategy was still a kind of strategic Far 
West, Baron engaged in a long series of studies of its implications for firms and 
strategy in general. 
In a series of papers from 2001 to 2009, he focused on the analysis of “private 
politics” and the economics of “corporate social responsibility” – both expressions 
echoing as oxymorons for most of management academics and professionals. In his 
first paper in 2001, “Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility and Integrated 
Strategy,” he insists on the continuum with his work on integrated strategy. The 
general purpose is to look at how interest groups and activists succeed in disturbing 
economic activities. According to Baron, their strategies are based on two 
mechanisms, both being named “politics.” In this context, the term politics does not 
refer to the original Greek meaning, i.e. the administration of the city (polis in 
Ancient Greek) and its members. It consists in a social mechanism through which 
agents try to promote their interests, whether they are individual or collective: 
 2. Conference “The Economics 
o f  C o r p o r a t e  S o c i a l 
Responsibility”, Paris, June 
9th and 10th, co-organized by 
École des Mines-Paristech, 
Paris School of Economics, 
U n i v e r s i t é  P a r i s  1 
Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
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The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in 
which people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on 
others (Baron, 2003, p. 33). 
From this perspective (our purpose here is not to discuss the internal validitiy of 
Baron’s conception of “politics”), therefore, the expression “public politics” is not a 
pleonasm but instead means that the political game involves public actors and 
institutions. On the contrary, private politics occur when the parties are all private 
and do not use public institutions to defend their position: 
The term private means that the parties do not rely on the law or public 
order; i.e., on lawmaking or law enforcement, although both may be 
available. […] In public politics this [politics] generally involves a rule that 
allows a majority to impose its will on a minority. The private politics 
considered here does not involve voting but does involve the public. The 
public is not viewed as a unitary actor but instead as individuals whose 
actions are voluntary and may or may not be similar. The resolution of 
conflict, if there is one, is by mutual agreement […]. The result can be a 
private ordering established by opponents and designed to maintain order 
given the continuing conflicting interests of the parties (Baron, 2003, p. 33-
34). 
Baron is actually doubly restricting his research domain in his paper. Only 
relationships involving firms on the one hand and groups or individuals on the other 
hand are studied, whereas the definition of private politics suggests a wider scope of 
inquiry, including all kinds of relationships between private actors, individuals, 
groups or organizations. As a matter of fact, activists are not always individuals or 
groups of individuals but can have an organizational form, but Baron does not 
identify the possible consequences of their different natures as an important future 
question in his research agenda. The second restriction lies in the focus on conflict 
situations and the possibility of converging interests between firms and activists 
although partnership strategies are now widespread and largely studied – Baron 
himself mentions that: “environmental Defense has increasingly worked with firms to 
implement programs based on economic incentives” (Baron, 2003, p. 51) 
but does not go further. Another central point resides in the choice actors actually 
make between private or public politics, a point that is raised by Baron as an 
important issue to be looked at in further research: 
Private politics often takes place in the shadow of government, and activists 
undertaking private politics may have the outside option of engaging in 
public politics (Baron, 2003, p. 45). 
At this stage of his research programme, he acknowledges that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence but not of “anecdotal evidence” of the importance of private 
politics. More precisely: 
The principal research challenges are to represent the preferences of activists 
and members of the public, capture the direct competition between 
interests, incorporate the role of news media as professionnal but strategic 
players, and represent how and when the public respond to that competition 
(Baron, 2003 p. 64). 
After the first two papers setting the frame of the analysis, Baron coedited with 
Daniel Diermeier a special issue of the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 
in 2007. No more narrative approach of informal and exploratory models of private 
politics game like in 2003, but strong economic models focusing on some questions 
raised in the former papers. In a first paper, Baron and Diermeier (2007) propose a 
model of strategic activism focused on the problem of the target choice. How do 
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interest groups choose their target? The model is very refined and includes the 
target’s media exposure, its reputation for responsiveness, the credibility of the 
activist to exploit a successful campaign and its time-horizon. The second paper is 
about another crucial point raised in the 2001 paper. Baron (2007) focuses on social 
entrepreneurship and the strategic foundations of corporate social responsibility. 
Baron defends an original point of view on the theory of the firm: thinking of the 
authentic CSR, is to think about the ends of economic activities and the foundations 
of strategy: “what the firm should do” (Baron, 2007, p. 688). 
Baron considers CSR as a mechanism for redistributing resources (Carroll, 1979; 
Freeman, 1984, Preston & Post, 1975; Wood, 1991). But the relevant question to ask 
is “why?”: why a firm would allocate part of its profit for social causes? CSR is based 
on volunteer engagement, or at least behavior that is not required by law: 
CSR thus involves going beyond what the letter and spirit of the law require 
or the market demands and requires in the model considered here altruistic 
preferences (Baron, 2001, p. 12)3. 
The key element lies in the motivation of entrepreneurs and investors: one has to 
take into account a set of variables of the firm’s environment to assess the possibility 
of CSR or its authenticity. Sometimes tax issues or social good production can be 
positive rewards for CSR (Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989). The cost of CSR is not 
always paid by the entrepreneur: authentic CSR is a strategic decision of 
entrepreneurs who decide to create a social business. If so, CSR is not only corporate 
social performance (CSP), i.e.: 
The private provision of public goods or the private redistribution of profit 
to social causes (Baron, 2009, p. 7). 
It is the entrepreneur’s motivation for doing business. It is possible if, and only if, 
the redistribution of financial returns and profits is considered by the investor as a 
perfect substitute for investment in profit-maximizing firms complemented by 
personal philanthropy. Only then will the entrepreneur be willing to bear the cost of 
CSR: 
This means that the financial and social returns from a CSR firm can be 
replicated by a linear combination of personal giving and shareholdings in 
profit-maximizing firms (Baron, 2007, p. 715). 
Lastly, Baron et al. (2009) model interactions between the three main categories of 
actors engaged in private politics – the firm, the citizens-investors, the activists – 
and look for the conditions for an equilibrium between a market of goods, a market 
of financial assets, and a market of social pressure. 
All in all, we see that Baron does not analyze per se the concepts of “politics” or 
“responsibility” in the business environment but his work highlights important 
social and economic dynamics that are changing the way firms behave in their 
nonmarket environments. We also gain the insight of complex connections that are 
occurring between the market and nonmarket spheres. 
Down to the Mines 
Now, I will summarize the main points of the lecture at the École des Mines, and try 
to highlight some issues particularly important for anyone interested in CSR – and 
especially for those who are not economists. 
David Baron has been teaching CSR to MBA students for ten years, while 
conducting research in this area. During his keynote lecture, he chose to focus on the 
politics of CSR and the main ideas and problems stemming from this concept: the 
 3. In Baron (2007), the 
reference to The Market for 
Virtue (2005) is based on 
the same idea: Vogel (2005, 
p. 2) defines CSR, or 
b u s i n e s s  v i r t u e ,  a s 
“practices that improve the 
workplace and benefit 
society in ways that go 
above and beyond what 
companies are legally 
required to”. 
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discussion started at a conceptual level and then he discussed some more specific 
aspects and examples with the audience. Why should an economist start to talk 
about CSR as a political issue? If we imagine that the government would be socially 
efficient, would there be a need for CSP? For Baron, governments can fail because, in 
the political sphere, there is no equivalent of the Coase theorem4, because action is 
constrained by the majority rule, bureaucratic inertia or nature of government 
(authoritarian or democratic). For these reasons, it is important to think about CSR 
in relationship with the efficiency of government. The context is to be taken 
seriously and particularly the complexity of social interactions involved in CSR. 
Indeed, Baron’s models for CSR and private politics are concerned with the 
formalization of interactions and games involving at least three kinds of agents: the 
public agents (government and public institutions), the private economic agents 
(corporations) and the private noneconomic agents (NGOs, activists, etc.). 
For Baron, the term “responsibility” means duty, as in moral duty. The question of 
responsibility, when applied to corporations and the economic sphere, is not 
straightforward. In various cases, we can ask ourselves who is responsible? The 
consumer buying fairtrade coffee or the firm? And when it comes to self-regulation, 
is it being responsible or responsive? CSR is a complex issue, one can remain sceptical 
about it if the responsibility of the firm is also to achieve a certain level of 
performance. Baron does not think that CSR can be reduced to corporate social 
performance (CSP). To distinguish one from another, we have to look at the 
motivations of action and more particularly what motivates as investor, a 
stakeholder or a manager. CSP, as mentionned above, means “the private provision of 
public goods or socially-beneficial redistribution of profits to social causes that goes beyond 
legal obligations” (Baron, 2009, p. 7). 
Baron’s hypothesis is that to assess CSP and decide whether or not it can be 
considered as CSR, we have to analyze the motivations for CSP: 
It may be motivated by a moral duty or by self-interest and may be 
voluntary or in response to social pressure (Baron, 2009, p. 7). 
CSR is CSP motivated by moral duty. Examples for morally-motivated behavior can 
be refusing corruption or bribery (Unilever leaving Bulgaria) or censorship (Google 
in China). Those are political examples – certainly not without economic motivation 
as well. But Baron’s position is that CSP is mostly strategic: it is an instrument to 
maximize profit. Other reasons can motivate firms to enhance their CSP, such as 
mimetism and rational imitation, the need to alleviate social pressure, or even the 
personal preferences of managers. 
When investigating CSR, we can ask firms what they think they are doing. When 
engaging in CSR actions, they say that they are “making business sense.” What does 
that mean? Are they maximizing profit, if that is the sense of business as Milton 
Friedman would defend (Friedman, 1970)? Are they making zero profit but sense? 
Are they even sacrificing profit in order to create more sense? 
Why should corporations care about CSR? A special report of The Economist in 2008 
showed that CSR has become mainstream, though it remains controversial5. 
Moreover, the public believes a lot more in NGOs than in global companies, which 
have the lowest level of public trust6. 
The Nike case is a good example of the contemporary importance of public 
reputation and trust: after it was pointed out for its unethical behavior the company 
became a leader in CSP. It is worth noting that campaigns are not always directed 
 4. In 1966, George Stigler 
(Nobel Prize 1992) named 
the theorem after another 
Nobel Prize, Ronald Coase 
who originally developed 
the notion of transaction 
cost. The theorem states 
that in a situation of perfect 
market competition when 
there is no transaction cost, 
agents will choose an 
efficient set of inputs to 
production and outputs from 
production independently 
from the assignment of 
property rights over the 
inputs. 
5. http://www.economist.com/
node/10491077 
6. Survey from 2001-2005 by 
GlobeScan for the World 
Economic forum, http://
w w w . g l o b e s c a n . c o m /
n e w s _ a r c h i v e s /
WEF_trust2005.html 
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against an industry, but are issue-related. There are usually cross-industry, for 
example when it comes to sweatshops and child labour or CO2 emissions. 
For an economist like Baron, the skepticism comes from the fact that it is difficult to 
study CSP like one can study industrial organization (IO). There is a lot more 
ambiguity about information structure and thus predictions are made more 
difficult – whereas in IO one can predict too much, or almost anything... Moreover, 
predictions that are sensitive to institutional structure give alternative hypotheses 
that can be tested, but the problem is: can we find the data to test them? For 
example, if one wants to study the motivations for CSP, one can try to test the 
rewards that people get from CSP. Rewards can come from the market place, 
internal efficiency and better governance, framing a more favourable government 
policy, or fulfilling a moral duty. When we look at such issues, the problem is that 
usually we observe a big difference between what people say and what they do. If 
there are rewards for CSP, who captures them? Will they be competed away? One 
idea is that the competitiveness of an industry affects CSP: strategic CSP provides 
product differentiation (green product). So, if an industry becomes more competitive, 
there should be more CSP (Fernández-Kranz & Santaló, 2007). Fernández-Kranz 
and Santaló (2007) argue that CSP should be independent of industry 
competitiveness if it is morally motivated. They find that CSP was greater and social 
pressure less in more competitive industries, suggesting that CSP is strategic rather 
than morally motivated. But, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among 
firms, Baron et al. (2009) find no effect of competitiveness on either CSP or social 
pressure. 
Towards the end of the conference, Baron suggested that his audience should as well 
look outside of economics and have a look at what sociologists, psychologists or 
political scientists are doing. Indeed, he pointed out several points of interests for 
economists that have already been addressed by other scholars in the social sciences.  
Let’s take first the issue of the governance of self-regulation organizations. Baron 
raises a series of questions to investigate. Who participates? Do they function 
through open or restricted membership? Are firms alone or are they cooperating as 
well with NGOs? Who has governance rights? What are the decision making 
processes? It appears that these questions are raised by a group of Swedish scholars 
from the Stockholm School of Economics and Stockholm University, the SCORE 
(Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research). The work of Nils Brunsson and 
Göran Ahrne on “metaorganisations” (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008) or the work of 
Kristina Tamm Hallström, Christina Garsten and Magnus Boström on 
accountability and governance of transnational standardization (Boström & 
Garsten, 2008; Tamm-Halström & Böstrom, 2010) address these issues on the new 
form of governance and interactions between heterogeneous stakeholders. Not only 
do they provide for original and insighful theory, but they also present rich case 
studies. 
Another point is risk management: CSP can be considered as an asset and can help 
build a reputation, such a reputation being useful during a crisis. Those issues are 
addressed by a variety of management scholars using various approaches (Barnett, 
2006; Scott & Walsham, 2005; Power et al., 2009; Fombrun, Gardberg & Barnett, 
2000). We can also mention the Corporate Reputation Review, edited by Charles 
Fombrun (Reputation Institute) and Cees van Riel (Erasmus University 
Rotterdam). In a current research project, I use this review as a starting point – both 
for theory and methods – to investigate how firms in the cement industry develop 
and implement social reputation strategies (Bastianutti, 2011). 
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In his current research, Baron focuses on how firms are working with NGOs. Can we 
find relationship patterns, i.e. predicting which firm is matched with which NGO? 
And then, can we measure how much CSP is generated? It appears that NGOs are 
less confrontational than before. Some NGOs develop expertise and trade their 
expertise, cooperate with firms to help them change their behavior. The cooperative 
activist tends to align with firms having a good CSP whereas the confrontational 
activist tends to get at the profit-maximizing firm. This is a promising research 
agenda, and a lot of scholars not only in sociology or political science but also in 
strategic management or economy are investigating the topic. 
Conclusion 
Even for non-economists understanding little of all the subtleties of the equations 
and models, David Baron’s papers are full of stimulating ideas and hypothesis. Any 
PhD student or researcher interested in CSR, or in the relationships between 
business and its environment, would certainly find something interesting in his work. 
But in a context of great specialization and professionalization of academia, why 
should a management PhD student (especially with a background in sociology and 
philosophy...) spend time reading and listening to David Baron? The rules of the 
game for PhD students involve publishing papers in high-ranked journals as if we 
were already confirmed researchers. We have to specialize in a field – often quite 
narrow – and become members of a “research community” by attending 
conferences, by knowing the right references and authors to cite, which journals to 
publish in, etc. As research becomes more and more professional, the danger is to 
reduce the work of academics to a standardized production of papers testing 
hypotheses to confirm or nuance previous studies. It is a debate that we all know 
about and that comes up every two seconds in academic conversations. 
Fortunately, some prominent scholars are still defending the virtues of intellectual 
wandering and interdisciplinary dialogue. Andrew Abbott7, a sociologist at the 
University of Chicago, says “You must read broadly in social science and beyond. The 
more you have to draw on, the better. That is why many great social scientists are part-
time dilettantes, always reading outside their fields […]” (Abbott, 2004, p. 118). 
Reading outside one’s field is important, as it is to be able to borrow and adapt 
approaches or ideas from one field to another, as did Gary Becker with his economic 
model of marriage (Becker, 1973) or Freeman and Hannan with the notion of 
population ecology (1977)8. In 2005, Diego Gambetta (Nuffield College, Oxford) gave 
a lecture in Paris on the value of incompetence, comparing the cases of the Sicilian 
mafia and the academic world, that Hervé Dumez reported (2006). When 
summarizing Gambetta’s method, he highlights the fact that economic theories, 
concepts and models are one of the best instruments to help the researcher to break 
with obivious ideas, admitted facts or evident theories. Economic models are 
simplified frameworks designed to better understand complex processes, by selecting 
a set of variables and then finding a set of logical and/or quantitative relationships 
between them. By simplying reality with a tight rigor, when they are astutely used 
and applied, they enable us to break with the common sense. They complement more 
qualitative approaches used to describe social complexity and explain unexpected 
facts or extreme situations9. 
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